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Church, State, and Education in Canada 
and the United States: 
A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law 
Edward G. HUDON* 
Aux Etats-Unis comme au Canada il y a toujours eu, et il continue à y 
avoir, des problèmes à propos du rôle de l'Etat dans le domaine de l'éducation 
confessionnelle. Au Canada, l'article 93 de l'Acte de l'Amérique du Nord bri-
tannique protège les droits confessionnels des catholiques et des protestants. 
Aux Etats-Unis, le premier amendement à la Constitution ordonne une 
séparation entre l'Eglise et l'Etat. Il y a également /'Establishment Clause qui 
défend que l'Etat subventionne les écoles confessionnelles. 
Dans cet article, l'auteur retrace l'interprétation donnée à l'article 93 de 
/'Acte de l'Amérique du Nord britannique ainsi que l'interprétation donnée à 
/'Establishment Clause du premier amendement de la Constitution américaine, 
et fait des comparaisons entre les deux. En conclusion, il constate que même les 
juges les plus savants ne pourront peut-être jamais trouver la solution définitive 
aux problèmes qui se posent. 
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Introduction 
Both Canada and the United States have had repeated separation of 
church and state problems with respect to education. In Canada the 
problems stem from the fact that publicly supported sectarian schools are 
not only allowed to exist, but are in fact protected by Article 93 of the British 
North America Act which, although each Province is given the exclusive 
power to make laws in relation to education, nevertheless provides : 
(1) Nothing in any such Law [enacted by a provincial legislature] shall prejudicially 
affect any Right or Privilege with respect to Denominational Schools which any 
Class of Persons have by Law in the Province at the Union; 
(2) All of the Powers, Privileges, and Duties at the Union by Law conferred and 
imposed in Upper Canada on the Separate Schools and School Trustees of 
the Queen's Roman Catholic subjects shall be and the same are hereby extended 
to the Dissentient Schools of the Queen's Protestant and Roman Catholic 
Subjects in Quebec. 
In the United States the situation is different. There, sectarian denomi-
national schools also exist. Indeed, their right to exist was upheld by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, decided in 
1925 '. However, that is where any similarity between Canada and the 
United States with respect to sectarian education ends because of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which provides in part : 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof. 
The Amendment has been interpreted to mean that there is a "wall of 
separation" between church and state that prevents the use of public funds 
for the support of sectarian education 2. But though the situation in the 
United States with respect to denominational schools is different from that 
which exists in Canada, in neither country do the problems presented lack 
intensity. 
1. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
2. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947). 
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1. The Canadian Church and State School Controversies: 
A Resume 
1.1. The Manitoba School Question 
In the past, in Canada the controversies that have arisen have generally 
been the result of instances in which a Province, or a lesser political 
subdivision, has tried to interfere with the "constitutional sanctity" given 
government supported sectarian schools by the British North America Act1. 
Certainly, the Manitoba school question is the most celebrated of these 
controversies. It arose in 1890 when the Province enacted a law which 
abolished the protection given sectarian schools by the 1870 Manitoba Act*, 
and replaced it with a non-sectarian school system5. That controversy was so 
bitter that it even caused the fall of the Canadian Government that tried to 
resolve the question by the issuance of a remedial order following an appeal 
to the Governor-General in Council as provided for by the British North 
America Act when a Province refuses to budge, and after that Government 
sought the enactment of a Remedial Act when the Manitoba Legislature 
refused to comply with the Remedial Order6. The matter was resolved by the 
Laurier-Greenway settlement, a compromise entered into between Provin-
cial officials and the new Liberal Government of Canada headed by Sir 
Wilfrid Laurier7. 
1.2. The Ontario Secondary Education Dispute 
There have been other church-state school controversies in Canada that 
are as notable as the Manitoba School Question, but none has been as bitter. 
Thus, there was the Ontario secondary education dispute that was settled in 
Roman Catholic Separate School Trustees for Tiny v. The King*. In this 
3. See D.A. SCHMEISER, Civil Liberties in Canada, London, Oxford University Press, 1964, 
Chap. IV, "Denominational Education." 
4. The Manitoba Act, 1970, 33 Victoria, Chap. 3, confirmed by The Imperial Act, 34-35 
Victoria, c. 28. 
5. An Act Respecting Public Schools, 53 Victoria, chap. 38; An Act Respecting the Depart-
ment of Education, 53 Victoria, chap. 37. See Barrett v. City of Winnipeg, [1890] 7 
Manitoba Reports 273, [1891] 19 Canada Supreme Court Reports 374, [1892] A.C. 445; 
Brophy v. Attorney General of Manitoba, [1895] A.C. 202. 
6. See Peter B. WAITE, Canada. 1874-1896, Toronto/Montreal, McClelland and Stewart, 
1971. Chap. 13, "The Fall of the Conservative Government, 1895-1896"; Lovell Clark, 
The Manitoba School Question: Majority Rule or Minority Rights?, Toronto, Cop Clark 
Publishing co., 1968. 
7. See Oscar D. SKELTON, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, v. 2, New York, The Century 
Co., 1922. 
8. The citations to the case as it traveled through the courts are as follows : 59 Ontario Law 
Reports 96, 60 Ontario Law Reports 15, [1927] Canada Supreme Court Reports 637, 
[1928] A.C. 363. 
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controversy the Trustees of the Roman Catholic separate schools objected to 
a 1915 regulation that deprived them of the right to establish and maintain 
courses beyond Form V, deprived them of public support for separate 
schools beyond that Form, and deprived them of the right to be exempt from 
taxation for the support of schools beyond that Form not conducted by their 
own Board of Trustees. Actually, the controversy centered around an 1871 
Act to improve the common and grammar schools of the Province of 
Ontario which made Public Schools out of what had been Common Schools, 
and High Schools out of what had been Grammar Schools9. The Act did not 
mention Separate Schools and it was because of this that the 1915 Regu-
lation, which was upheld by the Privy Council in Tiny, could prevent Catholic 
separate schools from giving instruction at the high school level, even though 
they had been doing it since Confederation. 
Then in Ontario there is Trustees of the Roman Catholic Separate 
Schools of the City of Ottawa v. Mackell, decided in 1917 10, a case in which it 
was held that the protection given separate schools by the British North 
America Act conferred a right or privilege "determined according to religious 
belief, and not according to race or language"." 
1.3. Quebec and the School Question 
In the Province of Quebec, the controversies that have arisen in the past 
have centered around who should go to which school. Thus, Separate School 
Trustees v. Shannon '2 involved the children of a mixed marriage with the 
father Protestant and the mother Roman Catholic. Even though the children 
were baptized Roman Catholics and presumably brought up as Catholics, it 
was held that Protestant dissentient schools had to accept as pupils the 
children of a dissentient ratepayer which the father was, regardless of the 
religious belief of the children, so long as they were of school age '3. 
9. Statutes of the Province of Ontario, 34 Victoria, Chap. 33. 
10. [1917] A.C. 62. 
11. [1917] A.C. 62, 69. See also McCarthy v. The City of Regina and Board of Trustees of the 
Public School(Ne'tda case), [1917] 1 Western Weekly Reports 1088, a Saskatchewan case in 
which it was held that one not of the religious faith of a minority could not exercise the 
right given the minority and had to be assessed for the support of the public schools. In 
addition see McCarthy v. The City of Regina et al. (Barton case), [1917] 1 Western Weekly 
Reports 1105, another Saskatchewan case in which it was held that the right to pay taxes 
to the public school instead of to the separate school was not a right or privilege reserved 
to the minority. 
12. [1930] 4 D.L.R. 190. 
13. For the decision of the lower Quebec courts, see [1929] 67 Quebec Superior Court Reports 
263, and [1929] 47 Quebec King's Bench Reports 242. 
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Next, there was the question of Jewish children who, though neither 
Catholic nor Protestant, were classified as Protestants for school purposes 
by a 1903 Quebec law u . When the question of the validity of the Quebec law 
finally reached the Privy Council in Hirsch v. Protestant Board of School 
Commissioners of Montreal ", it was found untenable that the word "Protes-
tant" as it was used in the statute should be construed to include Jews. 
Furthermore, even though the British North America Act protects the rights 
that belonged to Roman Catholics and Protestants at the time of the Union, 
it was decided that it would be to give a meaning to that statute "which its 
words will not bear" to treat the members of these two denominations as "a 
class of persons" who have the right to object to the establishment of a 
school not under Christian control '6. To this it was added that the 
Legislature of the Province could frame legislation for the establishment of 
separate schools for non-Christians, which is what happened. 
Then there are the Jehovah's Witness cases, Perron v. School Trustees of 
the Municipality of Rouyn " and Chabot v. School Commissioners of Lamo-
randière n. In the former, the children of Jehovah's Witnesses were refused 
admission to a Protestant school because they were said not to qualify as 
Protestants ". In the latter, the Chabot case, the question was whether a non-
Catholic taxpayer can demand that his children be admitted to a Catholic 
school, the only school in the community, without having to follow religious 
instruction or take part in Catholic devotions. 
In the Perron case the Court of Appeals for the Province rejected the 
contention that, though former Catholics, the Perrons could not be reco-
gnized as Protestants because they now belonged to a sect that was not only 
separate and distinct from Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism, but 
was opposed to all religions as well. Instead, the Court held that to be a 
Protestant it was sufficient if one had repudiated the authority of the Pope 
which the Perrons had done. Their children were ordered admitted to the 
Protestant dissident school. In the Chabot case, natural law was cited as 
authority from which "it is necessary to conclude that children who attend a 
school are not obliged to follow a religious teaching to which their father is 
opposed20." The Court ruled that the children could not be expelled from 
the Catholic school for not participating in religious exercises to which their 
father was opposed. 
14. 3 Edw 7, c. 16. 
15. [1928] A.C. 200. 
16. Ibid., pp. 203, 204. 
17. [1956] 1 D.L.R. (2d) 414. 
18. [1958] 12 D.L.R. (2d) 796. 
19. [1956] 1 D.L.R. (2d) 414, 416. 
20. See the opinion of PRATTE, J., [1958] 12 D.L.R. (2d) 796, 802. 
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1.4. Notre-Dame-des-Neiges and the Development 
of a Different Problem 
Now, at least in the Province of Quebec, a different problem has 
developed with respect to the extent of the protection given sectarian schools 
by Section 93 of the British North America Act. This problem stems from the 
fact that in the Province of Quebec, or at least in parts of it, a radical change 
is taking place as the population is changing from one that in the past has 
been either Roman Catholic or Protestant to one that is becoming more and 
more pluralistic. And that has had an important impact on areas such as the 
Côte-des-Neiges part of Montreal in which a French-speaking Roman 
Catholic parish was organized in 1901 and which was annexed to Montreal 
in 19082I. 
With the passage of time, the character of the population of this area 
changed to the point that the latest statistics, already nine years old, indicate 
that the population is a mere 50.4% Catholic, with the other 49.6% being 
27.7% Jewish, 13.1% Protestant, 2.7% Orthodox, and 6.1% without religious 
preference22. This had an adverse effect on the Notre-Dame-des-Neiges 
school which has been in existance since 1848. As early as 1973 the school 
was threatened with being closed because of the lack of students, but when 
the non-Catholic students were asked to stay so that the school could remain 
open the school population increased. However, the proportion of the non-
Catholic students increased dramatically, as did the number of parents who 
asked that their children be exempt from Catholic religious instruction — 
from 26 to 36% over a period of four school years (1975-76 to 1978-79). As 
early as the school year 1972-73 a teacher asked to be exempt from having to 
give religious instruction. The outcome was a movement initiated by the 
parents to have the school abandon its sectarian Catholic status and have it 
become non-sectarian or pluralistic. The matter was brought to a head when 
those who opposed such a course brought suit to prevent the change23. 
Although polls taken of parents indicated that a majority of them 
favored the change, suit was brought against the Comité catholique du 
Conseil Supérieur de l'Education made up of a Catholic Bishop, Catholic 
priests, school administrators, and parents to prevent the change 24. The case 
was heard by Chief Judge Jules Deschenes of the Quebec Superior Court 
21. See Jocelyne DURAND, Guy DURAND, Lucie PROULX, Jean-Pierre PROULX, La Déconfes-
sionnalisalion de l'école ou le cas de Notre-Dame-des-Neiges, Montréal, Libre Expression, 
1980, Chap. 1. 
22. Dame Micheline Clément-Séguin et al. v. Le Procureur Général de la Province de Québec et 
ai, decided April 17, 1980, (not yet reported), Act. I. 
23. For the chronology of events see opinion of Judge Jules Deschenes, Prologue and Act I. 
24. For the names of all of the parties, see the caption of the case. 
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who rendered a decision on April 17, 1980, in which it was declared that the 
schools administered by the Catholic committee were, in law, sectarian and 
Roman Catholic, and which declared null and void the action of the 
Committee to change the Notre-Dame-des-Neiges school from sectarian to 
nonsectarian25. 
Judge Deschenes reasoned that the 1867 British North America Act 
guaranteed Roman Catholic parents in Quebec the right to sectarian schools. 
He decided further that schools administered by the Commission des écoles 
Catholiques de Montréal were already sectarian and Roman Catholic, and 
that a resolution adopted in 1974 by the Commission recognizing the Notre-
Dame-des-Neiges school as such was inapplicable. Both that resolution and 
the one adopted in 1979 revoking the sectarian character of the school were 
declared null and void. 
In his somewhat unique opinion with its prologue, acts, scenes, and 
epilogue, Judge Deschenes summarized the sequence of events that led to the 
attempt to secularize Notre-Dame-des-Neiges in which Bishop, priests, and 
laypersons participated. He also reviewed the history of education in Canada 
from pre-Confederation days to the present, and he touched on the conflicts 
that have taken place to achieve and preserve sectarian education. He 
stressed that the authority given the Provinces over education by the British 
North America Act is subordinate to the mandate of Article 93 of that Act 
that protects sectarian education26. 
Judge Deschenes recognized the difficulty that the development of a 
pluralistic society has produced27, but to him the solution does not reside in 
the suppression of sectarian education, nor in the surrepticious introduction 
of non-sectarian schools in a network of sectarian education28. Instead, he 
suggested the creation of a secular school commission that would be parallel 
to the existing Catholic and Protestant School Commissions29. But even if 
that is the path that should be followed in the future, he noted that he had to 
decide the case under existing law30. As he applied that law he found that the 
action of the Catholic School Commission that secularized the Notre-Dame-
des-Neiges school was illegal — null and void. Apparently an appeal has 
been filed. If so, the ultimate outcome should be as interesting as Judge 
Deschenes' opinion is. 
25. For further identification of the case, it is no. 500-05-010917-795, District of Montreal, 
Province of Quebec. 
26. Act 2, Scenes I and II. 
27. Act 4, Scene I. 
28. Act 4, Scene IV. 
29. Act 4, Scene IV. 
30. Épilogue. 
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2. The American Scene 
In the United States there is not the question of who can go to which 
school as there is in Canada, or whether the government is living up to its 
obligation to support sectarian schools. Instead, the question is whether the 
government is doing more than it should with respect to sectarian schools 
because of the prohibition of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, and this Clause has had a colorful career, particularly since it 
has been applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. Since the beginning, the purpose of the 
Clause has been to erect a wall of separation between church and state, but 
today the wall is not quite as high or as impregnable as it was only a few 
years ago. That is reflected in articles such as the one published early this 
year in the Boston Sunday Globe entitled, "High court admits it : Church-
state issue muddy31." Indeed, in recent years, as decision has followed 
decision, the wall has seemed to become more and more a "blurred, 
indistinct, and variable barrier." At least, that is the way it was described in 
one of the opinions of the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman 32. 
2.1. From Everson to Zorach v. Clauson 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides 
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Today, this Amendment, one of the 
first ten that constitute the Bill of Rights which went into force during 
December, 1791, applies not only to the relationship between church and 
state at the federal level in the United States, but, through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution which went into force in 1868 ", it applies 
equally to this relationship at the level of the States of the United States. Or, 
as Justice Hugh Black expressed it in Everson v. Board of Education of the 
Township of Ewing, decided in 1947 : 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this : 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person 
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for 
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be 
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a 
31. Boston Sunday Globe, Boston, Massachusetts, February 24, 1980, p. 41. 
32. 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
33. See John R. GREEN, "The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States", 97 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review. 608 (1948-49). 
E. G. HUDON L'Église, l'État et l'éducation 469 
state nor the Federal government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of 
any religious organizations or groups or vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the 
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of 
separation between church and state."'4 
From this it should not be assumed that there never were established 
churches in the United States. At the start of the American Revolution 
established churches existed in nine of the American colonies, and, in spite of 
increased agitation for the separation of church and state from the very start 
of the Revolution, it was not until 1833 that disestablishment took place in 
Massachusetts35. Also, New Hampshire had an established church until 1817 
and Connecticut until 1818 36. 
Moreover, in spite of the clarity of Justice Black's explanation of the 
meaning of the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment, 
the interpretation of the clause and its application have not been easy or 
without dissent. Indeed, even in Everson in which the Justice gave his 
celebrated explanation of the clause, he wrote for a majority of a divided 
Court. At issue in the case was a state statute that authorized the 
reimbursement of parents for the expense of public bus transportation of 
children who attended Roman Catholic as well as public schools. The vote in 
the case was five to four to uphold the statute, with dissents written by 
Justices Jackson and Rutledge in which Justices Frankfurter and Burton 
joined37. The gist of Justice Black's majority opinion was that it could not be 
said that the First Amendment prohibited the State of New Jersey from 
spending tax raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a 
part of a general program under which it paid the fares of pupils attending 
public and other schools. 
Although the vote was seven to one in McCollum v. Board of Education 
of School District No. 71, Champaign County, Illinoisw, in which the Court 
struck down that part of a state compulsory education law that permitted 
religious classes in public schools, there was anything but unanimity even 
among the seven who voted to strike down the law. Justice Frankfurter 
wrote a separate opinion in which he was joined by three other Justices39. In 
34. 330 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1947). 
35. See William Warren SWEET, The Story of Religions in America, New York, Harper & 
Brothers, 1930, pp. 274, 275. 
36. Ibid., p. 275. 
37. For Justice Jackson's dissent in which Justice Frankfurter joined, see 330 U.S. 1, 18 ; for 
Justice Rutledge's dissent to which Justice Frankfurter, and Justices Jackson and Burton 
agreed, see 330 U.S. I, 28. 
38. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
39. Justices Jackson, Rutledge, and Burton, 333 U.S. 203, 212. 
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addition, Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion40, and Justice Reed 
dissented41. 
Again, the same thing happened in the controversial school prayer 
decisions, Engle v. Vitale''2 and Abington School District v. Schempp43, in 
which the recitation of prayers in public schools was found to violate the 
wall of separation between church and state. In each of these Justice Stewart 
dissented, but that is scarcely half of the story. In the First, Engle v. Vitale, 
the vote was six to one44 with Justice Douglas writing a concurring opinion 
in addition to Justice Stewart's dissent. In his opinion, Justice Douglas 
emphasized that the point for decision was whether the Government could 
constitutionally finance a religious exercise. Although he found that "Our 
system at the federal and state levels is presently honeycombed with such 
financing"45, he found invalid a New York law that required students to 
recite a prayer in the presence of a teacher at the start of each school day. 
In the Schempp case46, the second school prayer decision, the vote was 
eight to one, but it took four opinions for the nine Justices to dispose of the 
case. Justice Clark wrote the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas wrote a 
concurring opinion47 as did Justices Brennan48 and Goldberg49. Justice 
Harlan joined Justice Goldberg's concurrence50 and Justice Stewart wrote a 
dissenting opinion". 
The gist of Engle v. Vitale and Schempp was perhaps best expressed by 
Justice Douglas when he wrote in his concurring opinion in the latter: 
But the Establishment Clause is not limited to precluding the State itself from 
conducting religious exercises. It also forbids the State to employ its facilities or 
funds in a way which gives any church, or all churches, greater strength in our 
society than it would have by relying on its members alone." 
To say the least, Engle v. Vitale and Schempp provoked a controversy that is 
likely to continue for quite some time53. 
40. 333 U.S. 203, 232. 
41. Ibid., 238. 
42. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
43. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
44. Justices Frankfurter and White did not take part in the decision of the case. 
45. 370 U.S. 421, 437. See in particular, footnotes 1-9 to Justice Douglas' opinion. 
46. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
47. Ibid., 227. 
48. Ibid., 230. 
49. Ibid., 305. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid., 308. 
52. Ibid., 229. 
53. See, for instance, the numerous amendments to the Constitution to permit prayers in the 
public schools that were proposed during the 88"' Congress, lsl Session, as a result of 
Engle v. Vitale alone. In addition, see the numerous sermons, remarks, petitions, etc. 
printed in the Congressional Record for that session of the Congress of the United States. 
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Of all of the church and state cases, Zorach v. Clauson 54 is perhaps the 
most interesting. A six to three decision, it is interesting because of the line-
up of the Justices as the Court upheld the New York "release time" law, so 
called. According to this law, upon the written request of parents, the state's 
public schools were permitted to release children during school hours so that 
they might leave school property to go to religious centers for religious 
instruction or devotional exercises. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the 
Court, but Justices Black55, Frankfurter56, and Jackson57 each wrote 
dissenting opinions. 
The case is equally interesting because of some of the language that 
Justice Douglas used to uphold the law. As he distinguished this case from 
McCol/um v. Board of Education he wrote : 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We 
guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a 
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We 
sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one 
group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the 
appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates 
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian 
needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature 
of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold 
that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the 
government show a callous indifference to religious groups.'8 
Justice Black did not agree. To him, the plan, purpose, design and 
consequence of the New York release time law was "to help religious sects 
get attendants presumably too unenthusiastic to go unless moved to do so by 
the pressure of this state machinery59." To him, that violated the funda-
mental philosophy that he had expressed in the Everson60 and the McCol-
lum61 cases. It violated the wall of separation. 
Justice Jackson's reaction to the decision and the opinion of the Court 
was that "The wall which the Court was professing to erect between Church 
and State [in the McCollum case] has become even more warped and twisted 
than I expected62." 
54. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
55. 343 U.S. 306, 315. 
56. Ibid., 320. 
57. Ibid., 323. 
58. Ibid., 313, 314. 
59. Ibid., 318. 
60. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
61. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
62. 343 U.S. 306, 325. 
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2.2. The Wall of Separation, the Loan of Books and the Provision 
of Auxiliary Services to Sectarian Schools : 
A Turning Point or a Crack in the Wall? 
Perhaps Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen63, 
decided in 1968, can be considered the turning point in church and state 
cases that involve education. In that one, the Supreme Court upheld a New 
York law that authorized the free loan of textbooks to students in grades 
seven through twelve, whether they attended public or private (i.e., paro-
chial) schools. The law was found not to be one "respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof so as to conflict with the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. To Justice White 
who wrote the opinion of the Court, there was no difference between the 
result achieved in this case with that achieved in Everson 64 twenty-one years 
earlier. In Everson the objective was to provide all children with free needed 
transportation to and from school, whether public or parochial ; in the 
present case the objective was to provide all children with needed school 
books of a secular nature, regardless of the type of school they attended, 
whether public or parochial. 
Possibly Justice Harlan best explained the decision of the Court, as well 
as predicted the course that the Court would soon follow in similar cases, 
when he wrote in his concurring opinion : 
I would hold thai where the contested governmental activity is calculated to achieve 
nonreligious purposes otherwise within the competence of the State, and where the 
activity does not involve the State "so significantly and directly in the realm of the 
sectarian as to give rise to... divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom," ... it is 
not forbidden by the religious clauses of the First Amendment.65 
Justices Black, Douglas, and Fortas did not agree. Justice Black 
considered the New York law "a flat, flagrant, open violation of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments66." Justice Fortas considered that in deciding 
the case the Court ignored a vital aspect of it. To him, "despite the 
transparent camouflage that books [were] furnished to students, the reality 
[was] that they [were] selected and their use [was] prescribed by the sectarian 
authorities67." However, it was Justice Douglas who perhaps delivered the 
most telling blow by way of dissent when he wrote: 
Whatever may be said of Everson, there is nothing ideological about a bus. There is 
nothing ideological about a school lunch, or a public nurse, or a scholarship. The 
constitutionality of such public aid to students in parochial schools turns on 
63. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
64. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947). 
65. 392 U.S. 236, 249. 
66. Ibid., p. 250. 
67. Ibid., 269, 270. 
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considerations not present in this textbook case. The textbook goes to the very heart 
of education in a parochial school. It is the chief, although not solitary, instru-
mentality for propagating a particular religious creed or faith. How can we possibly 
approve such state aid to a religion? A parochial school textbook may contain 
many, many more seeds of creed and dogma than a prayer. Yet we struck down in 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, an official New York prayer for its public schools, even 
though it was not plainly denominational. For we emphasized the violence done the 
Establishment Clause when the power was given religious-political groups "to write 
their own prayers into law." Id., at 427. That risk is compounded here by giving 
parochial schools the initiative in selecting the textbooks they desire to be furnished 
at public expense.68 
The question of the loan to nonpublic elementary and secondary 
schools of books "acceptable for use in" public schools came up again in 
Meek v. Pittenger''''. However, now there was added to this the loan of 
instructional materials and equipment useful to the education of nonpublic 
school children. This included guidance, counseling and testing services; 
psychological services ; services for exceptional children, remedial and 
therapeutic services ; speech and hearing services, services for the impro-
vement of the educationally disadvantaged (such as, but not limited to, 
teaching English as a second language), and such other secular, neutral, non-
ideological services as are of benefit to nonpublic school children and are 
presently or hereafter provided for public school children of the Common-
wealth 70. 
The Court upheld the loan of books provision of the Pennsylvania 
statute but struck down everything else. There was an opinion of the Court, 
but once more the Justices went off in just about every different direction. 
Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the 
opinion of the Court in all of which Justices Blackmun and Powell joined, 
and in all but Part III of which Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall 
joined7 '. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined72. Chief Justice 
Burger filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part73. Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part in which Justice White joined74. 
The Court approved the use of its three-part test announced in its earlier 
decisions that the District Court had used, i.e., (1) the statute must have a 
68. Ibid., 254 at 257. 
69. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
70. See Acts 194, 195, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, §9-972(a). 
71. 421 U.S. 349, 351. 
72. Ibid., 373. 
73. Ibid., 385. 
74. Ibid., 387. 
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secular legislative purpose, (2) it must have a "primary effect" that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, (3) the statute and its administration must 
avoid excessive government entanglement with religion7S. But it rejected and 
left for another day the decision of the validity of the auxiliary services by 
simply stating: 
We need not decide whether substantial state expenditures to enrich the curricula of 
church-related elementary and secondary schools, like the expenditure of state 
funds to support the basic educational program of those schools, necessarily result 
in the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity. For decisions of this 
Court make clear that the District Court erred in relying entirely on the good faith 
and professionalism of the secular teachers and counselors functioning in church-
related schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological posture is maintained.76 
The problems presented to the Court in Meek v. Pittenger were again 
before the Court in Wolman v. Walter, decided June 24, 1977 77. Again it was 
a question of a State (Ohio) providing nonpublic schoolchildren with books 
on a loan basis ; supplying them with such standardized tests and scoring 
services as were used in public schools; speech and hearing diagnostic 
services and diagnostic psychological services, specialized attention thera-
peutic, guidance, and remedial services ; instructional materials and instruc-
tional equipment of the kind used in the public schools that were incapable 
of diversion to religious purposes ; and field trip transportation and services 
such as were provided public school students. There were safeguards in the 
statute so that the church-state issue might be avoided such as having non-
public school personnel not involved in rendering the services. 
As the Court faced the issues presented, it was divided more than ever 
with the Justices again going off in every direction. Justice Blackmun 
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court 
with respect to Parts I, V, VI, VII, and VIII78, in which Justices Stewart and 
Stevens joined ; in which as to Part I, Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell also joined ; in which as to Part V Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Marshall and Powell joined ; and in which as to 
Part VI Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined ; in which as to 
Parts VII and VIII Justices Brennan and Marshall joined ; and an opinion 
with respect to Parts II, III, and IV in which Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Stewart and Powell joined. Chief Justice Burger dissented in part79. 
75. Ibid., 358. 
76. Ibid., 369. 
77. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
78. Ibid., 232. 
79. Ibid., 255. 
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Justices Brennan80, Marshall81, and Stevens82 filed opinions concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. Justice Powell83 filed an opinion concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justices 
White and Rehnquist84 filed a statement concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part. 
After all was said and done, it was found constitutional for the State to 
provide nonpublic school pupils with books, standardized testing and 
scoring, diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services. The parts 
of the statute that related to instructional materials and equipment and field 
trip services were found to be invalid. Once more the Court's three-pronged 
test was applied to the statute to separate the good from the bad. According 
to this test as Justice Blackmun stated it once more for the purposes of this 
case, "to pass muster, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, must 
have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, 
and must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion 85." 
But perhaps Justice Blackmun was a bit overoptimistic when he wrote: 
We have acknowledged before, and we do so again here, that the wall of separation 
that must be maintained between church and state "is a blurred, indistinct, and 
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." 
Lemon, 403 U.S., at 614. Nonetheless, the Court's numerous precedents "have 
become firmly rooted," Nyquisl, 413 U.S., at 761, and now provide substantial 
guidance.86 
Indeed, perhaps Justice Stevens hit the nail more squarely on the head when 
he wrote even as he explained his agreement with parts of the decision of the 
Court : 
This Court's efforts to improve on the Everson test have not proved successful. 
"Corrosive precedents" have left us without firm principles on which to decide these 
cases. As this case demonstrates, the States have been encouraged to search for new 
ways to achieve forbidden ends. See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquisl, 
413 U.S. 756, 785, 797. What should be a "high and impregnable" wall between 
church and state, has been reduced to a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier," 
ante at 236." 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
Ibid. 
Ibid., 256. 
Ibid., 264. 
Ibid., 262. 
Ibid., 255. 
Ibid., 236. 
Ibid., 236. 
Ibid., 266. See also Justice STEVENS Statement in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 
U.S. 736, 775 (1976) in which he wrote of "the pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to 
tempt religious schools to compromise their religious mission without wholly abandoning 
it." 
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2.3. Sectarian Primary and Secondary Schools versus 
Sectarian Institutions of Higher Learning 
and the Wall of Separation 
On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two 
more cases in the area of government aid to sectarian education. One, Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of Pennsylvania w, involved 
a Rhode Island salary supplement law that authorized the use of public 
funds to raise the salaries of nonpublic school teachers, and a Pennsylvania 
law that authorized the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to 
purchase certain secular educational services from nonpublic schools. The 
other, Tilton v. Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare19, 
involved the validity of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1967 90 which 
authorized federal grants and loans to institutions of higher education for 
the construction of "academic facilities." The Act expressly excluded "any 
facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious 
worship, or... primarily in connection with any part of the program of a 
school or department of divinity." Moreover, the Act provided that the 
United States retained a 20-year interest in any facility constructed with 
funds under the Act, during which period violations of the statutory 
conditions would entitle the Government to the recovery of the funds. 
In Lemon, a near unanimous, though somewhat fractured, Court struck 
down both the Rhode Island and the Pennsylvania statutes. Chief Justice 
Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Black, Douglas, 
Harlan, Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun joined. However, Justice Douglas 
filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Black and Marshall joined, but 
with Justice Marshall filing a separate statement. Justice Brennan filed a 
concurring opinion ; Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the 
Pennsylvania case but dissenting in the Rhode Island case. 
In the course of the opinion of the Court, the contribution of church-
related elementary and secondary schools in our national life was found to 
be enormous, but the programs involved were nevertheless said to be 
"something of an innovation91." Involvement or entanglement between 
government and religion was said to serve as a warning, as well as to 
constitute an independent evil "against which the Religion Clauses were 
intended to protect92." 
88. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
89. 403 U.S. 672 (1972). 
90. 77 Stat. 364, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§711-721. 
91. 403 U.S. 602, 624. 
92. Ibid., 624, 625. 
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The outcome in Tilton was different. Government aid to church-related 
primary and secondary schools was said to be unlike government aid to 
church-related institutions of higher education. The former was found to be 
in violation of the First Amendment, but the latter was not, except that the 
20-year limitation in the Act on the religious use of facilities constructed with 
federal funds was struck down. In arriving at this decision the Court was so 
divided that it could not agree on an opinion. Chief Justice Burger 
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which 
Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun joined93; Justice White filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment94 ; Justice Douglas filed an opinion 
dissenting in part in which Justices Black and Marshall joined95 ; and Justice 
Brennan dissented96. 
In his opinion, Chief Justice Burger wrote that the difference between 
aid to primary and secondary schools on the one hand, and aid to 
institutions of higher learning on the other, was that in the case of the former 
aid was given to the education of impressionable children, whereas in the 
case of the latter religious indoctrination was not a substantial purpose or 
activity of the institutions involved. At the college level, the facilities aided 
were said to be religiously neutral and in need of less governmental 
surveillance. 
Justice Brennan would have held the Higher Education Facilities Act 
unconstitutional "only insofar as it authorized grants of federal tax monies 
to sectarian institutions — institutions that have a purpose or function to 
propagate or advance a particular religion97." 
Justice Douglas stated that he dissented "not because of any lack of 
respect for parochial schools but of a feeling of despair that the respect 
which through history has been accorded the First Amendment is this day 
lost98." 
2.4. Voices in Dissent that Become the Majority View : 
A Deeper Crack or a Step Backward? 
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 99 and 
Sloan, Treasurer of Pennsylvania v. Lemon l0°, both decided on June 25, 1973, 
93. 403 U.S. 672, 674. 
94. 403 U.S. 602, 661. (See p. 689 of the Tilton case). 
95. 403 U.S. 672, 689. 
96. 403 U.S. 602, 642. (See p. 689 of the Tilton case). 
97. Ibid., 661. 
98. 403 U.S. 672, 689, 697. 
99. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
100. 413 U.S. X25 (1973). 
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the Court struck down support programs for religious-oriented nonpublic 
schools. In Nyquist, the New York Legislature had provided money grants to 
qualifying non-public schools for the maintenance and repair of facilities 
and equipment to ensure the student's health, welfare, and safety101. In 
Sloan, the Pennsylvania Legislature had enacted a Parent Reimbursement 
Act for Non-public Education 102 which provided funds for the reimbur-
sement of parents for a portion of the tuition expenses incurred in sending 
their children to nonpublic schools. 
In both cases, the laws were found to violate the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment. In each instance the effect of the plan was found to 
be to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools, and 
this was not altered by the fact that the money went to the parents rather 
than directly to the schools. Nor did it help any in Sloan when it was argued 
that if parents of children who attend nonsectarian schools could receive 
assistance, then "parents of children who attend sectarian schools are 
entitled to the same aid as a matter of equal protection l03." First, the 
Pennsylvania statute in question was found not to set up such a dichotomy 
between sectarian and nonsectarian schools ; second, even if it had, valid aid 
to nonpublic, nonsectarian schools "would," Justice Powell wrote for the 
Court, "provide no lever for aid to their sectarian counterparts 104." He 
continued : "The Equal Protection Clause has never been regarded as a 
bludgeon with which to compel a State to violate other provisions of the 
Constitution 10S." 
2.4.1. Voices in Dissent 
Nyquist and Sloan are important not only for what the Court decided, 
but also for what was said in dissent. In Nyquist, Chief Justice Burger106, 
joined in part by Justice White and joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred 
in part and dissented in part. Also, Justice Rehnquist107, with whom the 
Chief Justice and Justice White concurred, dissented in part. Then, Justice 
White 108, joined in part by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, 
dissented. In Sloan the Chief Justice dissented for the reasons that he had 
given in Nyquist, as did Justice White 109. 
101. New York Laws, 1972, c. 414, §1, amending the New York Education Law, Art. 12, 
§§549-553 (Supp. 1972-1973). 
102. Penna. Laws 1971, Art. 92, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 24, §§5701-5709 (Supp. 1973-1974). 
103. 313 U.S. 825, 834. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Ibid. 
106. 403 U.S. 756, 798. 
107. Ibid., 805. 
108. Ibid., 813. 
109. 413 U.S. 825, 835. 
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The gist of Chief Justice Burger's thinking is perhaps best summarized 
when, citing Everson v. Board of Education "°, and Board of Education v. 
Allen " ' , he wrote: 
While there is no straight line running through our decisions interpreting the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, our cases do, it 
seems to me, lay down one solid, basic principle : that the Establishment Clause 
does not forbid governments, state or federal, to enact a program of general welfare 
under which benefits are distributed to private individuals, even though many of 
those individuals may elect to use those benefits in ways that "aid" religious 
instruction or worship. Thus, in Everson the Court held that a New Jersey township 
could reimburse all parents of school-age children for bus fares paid in transporting 
their children to school. Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court stated that the 
New Jersey "legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a program to help 
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and 
from accredited schools." 330 U.S., at 18 (emphasis added). 
Twenty-one years later, in Board of Education v. Allen, supra, the Court again upheld 
a state program that provided for direct aid to parents of all schoolchildren 
including those in private schools. The statute there required "local public school 
authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven through 
12; students attending private schools [were] included." 392 U.S., at 238."2 
Justice Rehnquist also relied on the Everson and the Allen cases, but he 
also centered his reasoning on the reasoning found in Waltz v. Tax 
Comm'nul in which Chief Justice Burger had written: 
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not 
transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the 
church support the state. No one has ever suggested that tax exemption has 
converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state or put employees 
'on the public payroll.' There is no genuine nexus between tax exemptions and 
establishment of religion." 397 U.S., at 675 (emphasis added)."4 
Justice White's reasoning was different. Once more citing his dis-
satisfaction with Lemon v. Kurtzman in which he had concurred in the 
judgment and dissented in part "5, he wrote of the Constitutional right of 
parents "to send their children to nonpublic schools, secular or sectarian, if 
those schools were sufficiently competent to educate the child in the 
necessary subjects "6 ." To this he added, "A State should put no unnecessary 
obstacles in the way of religious training for the young. 'When the state 
encourages religious instruction... it follows the best of our traditions.' 
110. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
111. 392 U.S. 236(1968). 
112. 413 U.S. 756, 799. 
113. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
114. Ibid., at 675 (emphasis added by Justice Rehnquist). 
115. 403 U.S. 602, 661 (1971). 
116. 413 U.S. 756, 814. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), cited by Justice 
White. 
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Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S., 306, 313-314 (1952); Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 
397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) "7 ." Then, citing the decrease in nonpublic school 
enrollment and the resulting substantial increase in public school budgets, 
he concluded: 
There are, then, the most profound reasons, in addition to those normally attending 
the question of the constitutionality of a state statute, for this Court to proceed with 
the utmost care in deciding these cases. It should not, absent a clear mandate in the 
Constitution, invalidate these New York and Pennsylvania statutes and thereby not 
only scuttle state efforts to hold off serious financial problems in their public 
schools but also make it more difficult, if not impossible, for parents to follow the 
dictates of their conscience and seek a religious as well as secular education for their 
children. 
On the same day that the Nyquist and the Sloan cases were decided, the 
Court also decided Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious 
Liberty"9. In that case the Court again struck down a statute that was said 
to violate the wall of separation between Church and State. This time, the 
New York statute in question appropriated public funds to reimburse both 
church-sponsored and secular nonpublic schools for the preparation, admi-
nistration and reporting to state-mandated tests. The statute was consi-
dered invalid because it made no attempt, and there were no means avai-
lable, to assure that tests prepared in church-related schools were free of 
religious instruction. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger expressed 
the view of the majority that, 
We cannot ignore the substantial risk that these examinations, prepared by teachers 
under the authority of religious institutions, will be drafted with an eye, uncons-
ciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring 
church.124 
However, he left the door ajar when he wrote that since the offensive statute 
provided only for a single per-pupil allotment for a variety of specified 
services, some secular and some potentially religious, neither the Supreme 
Court nor the District Court could properly reduce that allotment to an 
amount "corresponding to the actual costs incurred in performing reimbur-
sable secular services 12'." "That," he wrote, "is a legislative, not a judicial, 
function l22." 
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall were of the view that affir-
mance of the lower court's decision striking down the statute was compelled 
117. 413 U.S. 756, 814. 
118. Ibid., 819, 820. 
119. 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
120. Ibid., 480. 
121. Ibid., 482. 
122. Ibid. 
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by the decision in Nyquist and that in Lemon m . However, Justice White 
dissented without stating his reasons in an opinion l24. Apparently he was 
waiting for another day. 
2.4.2. A Change of Position and the Dissenter Assumes Control 
After Levitt in which the 1970 statute providing for the reimbursement 
of sectarian as well as other nonpublic schools for the expense of state-
mandated tests was struck down, the New York Legislature went back to 
work and in 1974 it enacted another statute l25. In this one it sought to cure 
what was said to be wrong with the earlier statute and yet produce the 
desired result. Like the earlier statute, this one appropriated public funds to 
reimburse both church-sponsored and secular nonpublic schools for the 
expense of state-mandated tests. However, the later statute did not under-
take to reimburse nonpublic schools for the preparation, administration, or 
grading of teacher-prepared tests. Moreover, it provided for the auditing of 
the payment of state funds so that only the cost of secular services would be 
reimbursed with state funds. Nevertheless, the validity of the 1974 statute 
was questioned as the earlier one had been. However, this time, in 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan l26, decided 
February 20, 1980, the statute was upheld, but not without vigorous dissent. 
Joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Blackmun who had 
written the opinion of the Court in Wolman v. Walker nl less than three years 
earlier wrote: 
The Court in this case, I fear, takes a long step backwards in the inevitable 
controversy that emerges when a state legislature continues to insist on providing 
public aid to parochial schools.128 
Justice Stevens who had dissented in Wolman wrote: 
Rather than continuing with the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the 
"blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier" described in Lemon v. Kurnman, 403 U.S. 
602, 614, I would resurrect the "high and impregnable" wall between church and 
state constructed by the Framers of the First Amendment. See Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18.'" 
However strong Justices Blackmun and Stevens' dissents may have 
been, Justice White finally had his majority, though a slim one (5 to 4), with 
123. Ibid. 
124. Ibid. 
125. New York Laws, 1974, ch. 507 as amended by chap. 508. 
126. 100 S. Ct. 840 (1980). 
127. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
128. 100 S. Ct. 840, 851. 
129. Ibid., 855 at 856. 
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which to put over at least some of his views on the subject of public aid to 
church-related schools. But even as he did this he had to admit that neither 
this case, no more than past cases, would "furnish a litmus-paper test to 
distinguish permissible from impermissible aid to religiously oriented 
schools l3°." For, as he pointed out, "Establishment Clause cases are not 
easy ; they stir deep feelings ; and we are divided among ourselves, perhaps 
reflecting the different views on this subject of the people of this country 131." 
According to Justice White, under the precedents of the Court, "a 
legislative enactment does not contravene the Establishment Clause if it has 
a secular legislative purpose, if its principle or primary effect neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, and if it does not foster an excessive 
government entanglement with religion132." As he applied this three-
pronged test that had been developed earlier, he agreed that Wolman v. 
Walter controlled the case, although he apparently did not see eye to eye 
with Justice Blackmun, the author of Wolman, with what that case had 
decided. 
Although Justice White recognized that there were differences between 
the present case and Wolman, he did not consider these differences of 
constitutional dimension. As in Wolman, he found a clear secular purpose 
behind the legislation now before the Court to provide educational oppor-
tunity to prepare citizens for the challenge of American life in the last 
decades of the twentieth century. As in the earlier case, the tests were 
prepared by the State and administered on the premises by nonpublic 
school personnel. To him, here as in Wolman, the nonpublic schools 
controlled neither the content of the test nor its result, and thus prevented its 
use as part of religious teaching. As for the recordkeeping and the reporting 
of the results of the test, these were ministerial functions, not a part 
of the teaching process, and therefore could not be used to foster an 
ideological outlook. 
The fact that the New York statute provided for direct cash reimbur-
sement to nonpublic schools did not bother Justice White either. A contrary 
view would have meant drawing a constitutional distinction between paying 
nonpublic schools to grade tests and paying state employees or an inde-
pendent service to perform the task. Concluded Justice White : "None of 
our cases requires us to invalidate these reimbursements simply because they 
involve payments in cash. The Court 'has not accepted the recurring 
argument that all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution 
frees it to spend its other resources on religious ends.' Hunt v. McNair, 
413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)1"." 
130. Ibid., 840 at 851. 
131. Ibid. 
132. Ibid., 846. 
133. Ibid., 849. 
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The effect of Justice White's opinion for the majority of the Court was 
that Meek v. PittengerliA and Wolman v. Walterni had not, as Justice 
Blackmun thought, at last "fixed the line between that which is constitu-
tionally appropriate aid and that which is not136." Indeed, some who had 
sought to set the line in these cases, as well as in Lemon 137 and Levittl38, had 
defected to join Justice White to validate the statute in the present case, and 
this prompted Justice Blackmun to write: 
I am able to attribute this defection only to a concern about the continuing and 
emotional controversy and to a persuasion that a goodfaith attempt on the part of a 
state legislature is worth a nod of approval.139 
But whether or not that is true, though Committee for Public Education and 
Religious Liberty v. Regan 140 is the most recent case on the separation of 
church and state to be decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it 
certainly will not be the last. There will be others. Moreover, there will 
probably never be a single all-encompassing construction of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, as there never has been one to the Speech and Press Clause of the 
same Amendment. 
Summary and conclusion 
In Canada it is attempts to tamper with the protection given publicly 
supported sectarian education that has caused the problems ; in the United 
States the problems have been caused by attempts to tamper with the 
prohibition against the use of public funds for the support of sectarian 
education. In every instance, whether in Canada or in the United States, it 
generally has been a question of interpretation. What exactly is protected by 
Article 93 of the British North America Act, or what exactly is the nature of 
the prohibition of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States with respect to denominational schools ? How far does the protection 
given sectarian education in Canada extend, or how high and how impene-
trable is the "wall of separation" between church and state in the United 
States ? In Canada, the recent controversy over the secularization of the 
Notre-Dame-des-Neiges school is but the most recent case of that country's 
134. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
135. 433 U.S. 229(1977). 
136. 100 S. Ct. 840, 851. 
137. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
138. Levin v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973). 
139. 100 S. Ct. at 852. 
140. 100 S. Ct. 840 (1980). 
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long history of church-state relations with respect to education, as Commit-
tee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan is but the most recent 
case on the interpretation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment in the United States. There will be more such cases in both countries 
regardless of the wisdom of the courts that decide them. 
